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1 Introduction
Unemployment insurance (UI) schemes are a distinctive feature of modern economies and
have been frequently recognized to play an important role in determining labor market
outcomes. The possible influence of the level and duration of unemployment benefits
on unemployment and welfare has been given considerable attention in research. The
general argument usually put forward is that unemployment benefits improve the pay-
off from not working and decrease the incentives to supply labor. Accordingly, recent
work on the employment effects of unemployment benefits emphasizes the moral hazard
associated with the job search effort of the unemployed, e.g. Hansen/İmrohoroğlu (1992)
or Ljungqvist/Sargent (1998), the moral hazard associated with the job retention effort,
e.g. Wang/Williamson (1996), and the direction of search effort to high wage jobs, e.g. Bur-
dett (1979), Acemoglu (2001), Acemoglu/Shimer (1999), or Marimon/Zilibotti (1997). In
addition, Shavell/Weiss (1979), Frederiksson/Holmlund (2001), and Heer (2002a,2003) em-
phasize the fact that the duration period of most unemployment insurance programs are
limited and find that UI benefits should, optimally, decline over time.
The literature discussed in the preceding paragraph, however, considers the level of benefits
to be lump-sum. In most OECD countries, unemployment benefits consist of both unem-
ployment insurance and unemployment assistance.1 Most often, as e.g. in Belgium, France,
Germany, or the US, unemployment insurance payments are related to past contributions
and compensate for a loss of income for a limited duration. Afterwards, unemployed agents
rely on unemployment assistance which is usually lower than unemployment insurance and
most often unrelated to past contributions, e.g. in France, Germany after the Hartz IV re-
form, or the UK. Furthermore, most countries provide a minimum unemployment income
(often in the form of social assistance or welfare payments) and unemployment benefits
are only paid up to a certain level, e.g. in Belgium, Spain, or Japan. Consequently, unem-
ployment benefits in practice contain both a lump-sum component and a component that
1For the features of the different UI schemes in practice see OECD (1991, 1996).
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is proportional to previous unemployment contributions.
Different from the literature cited in the first paragraph of this introduction, we consider
a model with unemployment benefits that depend on previous labor earnings. Therefore,
the worker also considers the effect of his working hours on potential future unemployment
benefits when he chooses his labor supply. The employment status of the worker follows
an exogenous Markov process that is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the
German economy. In addition, we distinguish several productivity types so that we are
able to model the wage heterogeneity and the wage-age profile of the German economy as
well as the wage mobility of the German workers. Moreover, we endogenize the financing
of the unemployment insurance payments. In particular, we consider the case that total
government expenditures on unemployment compensation are constant for all cases consid-
ered and are to be financed by unemployment insurance contributions. As a consequence,
an increase of the part of unemployment insurance benefits that is proportional to past
earnings results in a decrease of the lump-sum part of unemployment insurance benefits
that is unrelated to previous earnings.
There are multiple effects of a more progressive indexation of unemployment benefits to
previous earnings on equilibrium values of employment, savings, output, and the distri-
bution of labor income: 1) The worker considers the likelihood to become unemployed in
the next period in his labor supply decision and, therefore, his incentives to supply la-
bor increase if unemployment benefits are stronger linked to previous earnings. 2) Higher
indexation of unemployment benefits to previous earnings with a compensating decrease
of the lump-sum component results in higher (lower) benefits for the unemployed workers
with previously high (low) labor income. Consequently, a more contributive unemployment
insurance scheme redistributes income from the unemployed low-productivity workers to
the unemployed high-productivity workers. As earnings peak around age 50, such a scheme
also redistributes income from the young unemployed workers to the old unemployed work-
ers. The redistribution is likely to also affect aggregate savings. The high-productivity
(low-productivity) unemployed workers will increase (reduce) savings when their wage re-
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placement income increases (decreases). Since the high-productivity workers have a higher
propensity to save out of income than the low-productivity workers,2 this effect is likely to
increase savings. However, the high-productivity (low-productivity) employed workers will
also reduce (increase) their precautionary savings. The overall effect on savings, therefore,
cannot be determined analytically. For this reason, we use a general equilibrium model
that is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the German economy in 1991-97.
In addition to the equilibrium effects on savings, labor supply, and the distribution of labor
income, we also study the welfare implications of a more progressive unemployment benefit
scheme. Again, there are multiple effects: First, labor replacement income is redistributed
from the low-productivity to the high-productivity workers. As we will measure welfare
by average utility we need to compare the respective gains and losses of the different un-
employed workers. Second, there are efficiency effects as aggregate savings and total labor
supply change. Third, a more contributive system increases uncertainty as labor income
(including replacement income) becomes more variable. Our welfare analysis, therefore, is
related to the recent literature on the effects of a consumption tax versus an income tax,
e.g. Nishiyama and Smetter (2005), that emphasizes the insurance properties of various
tax schemes and contrast them with the efficiency and distribution effects.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and discusses our
calibration. Our results are presented in section 3. First, we analyze the effects of higher
indexation assuming that government expenditures on unemployment benefits are constant.
Second, we also study the most recent Hartz IV reform that reduces benefit payments to the
long-term unemployed. In this case, government expenditures on unemployment insurance
fall. Section 4 concludes. The computational method is described in the Appendix.
2This empirical regularity is documented by Huggett and Ventura (2000), among others. They also
show that a model with earnings differences and a social security system, which is similar to ours, is able
to replicate these facts.
3We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us. Different from this problem
of optimal taxation, however, a reform of the unemployment insurance system only redistributes income
between different groups of workers and not between workers and retired agents.
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2 The Model
We study an Overlapping Generations (OLG) model with income uncertainty. Three sec-
tors can be depicted: the household sector, the production sector, and the government.
Households live for 60 years and maximize discounted life-time utility. Agents can either be
employed or unemployed during their working life. If employed, workers supply labor elas-
tically. Individuals are heterogeneous with regard to their income productivity and cannot
insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Firms maximize profits and produce output with
the help of labor and capital. The government provides social insurance which it finances by
a tax on wage income (or, equally, unemployment insurance contributions). Since we will
only analyze steady-state allocations, the time index is omitted from stationary variables
like, e.g., from the interest rate r or the wage rate w.
2.1 Households
Agents live for T + TR = 60 periods (60 years). The first T = 40 periods (40 years),
they are workers. The last TR = 20 periods of their life, they retire and receive pension
payments b. Households are of measure one and each generation is of equal measure 1/60.
Households are heterogeneous with regard to their age j, their productivity type z, and
their wealth k.4 We assume the individual productivity type z to take a value from the
finite set Z = {z1, z2, . . . , znz}, where z1 = 0 describes the state of unemployment. We
further assume that the productivity type follows a first order finite state Markov chain
4As we only consider one type of asset, we will refer to k as capital, wealth, and asset interchangeably.
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with conditional transition probabilities given by:5
π(z′|z) = Pr{zt+1 = z′|zt = z}, (1)
where z′ denotes the next-period productivity type and z, z′ ∈ Z. Individual productivity
is a function of the productivity type and the age, ε = ε(z, j).




βj−1 u(cj, 1− lj), (2)
where instantaneous utility u(cj, 1−lj) is assumed to be addititively separable in the utility
from consumption, c, and the utility from leisure, 1− l, as given by:6
u(cj, 1− lj) =
c1−σj
1− σ + γ0
(1− lj)1−γ1
1− γ1 . (3)
l denotes the labor supply. The total time endowment is normalized to one. Instantaneous
utility is discounted with the factor β, and σ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
If agents are unemployed or retired, they do not work (lj = 0 for z = z
1 or j > T ).
Agents are born without any assets, k1 = 0, and are not allowed to borrow, kj ≥ 0,
j = 1, . . . , T + TR. Furthermore, we assume that private insurance markets are absent.7
5Notice that the Markov transition probabilities do not depend on age. With this simplification, we
follow the traditional approach applied by the literature on dynamic general equilibrium in overlapping
generations models with idiosyncratic uncertainty, e.g. as in Huggett and Ventura (2000). A more ac-
curate, even though more demanding modelling device consists in the consideration and estimation of
age-dependent Markov transition processes. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing
this to our attention.
6Our choice of the functional form for utility follows Castañeda, Dı́az-Giminénez, and Rı́os-Rull (2003).
Most quantitative studies of general equilibrium model specify a Cobb-Douglas functional form of utility.
In this case, however, the elasticity of individual labor supply with regard to wealth is larger than for the
utility function (3) and, consequently, the distribution of both labor income and wealth that is implied by
the model is much more homogeneous than in the data.
7Chiu and Karni (1998) show that the presence of private information about individual’s work effort
helps to explain the failure of the private sector to provide unemployment insurance.
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Depending on his employment type z, his previous labor income w̃, and his labor supply
l, an agent at age j receives labor income yj(z, w̃, l) and earns interest income at rate r so
that the household faces the following budget constraint:
kj+1 + cj = (1 + r)kj + yj(z, w̃, l), (4)
where kj+1 denotes next period’s asset holdings. The labor income yj(z, w̃, l) of a j-year-old
household with productivity type z, previous labor income w̃ and labor supply l is given
by:




(1− τ)w ε(z, j) l z > z1, j ≤ T,
wUI(w̃) = wmin + θ(1− τ)w̃ z = z1, j ≤ T,
b j > T.
(5)
If the worker is employed, z > z1, he receives a wage rate that is proportional to his
productivity ε(z, j). If unemployed, z = z1, the worker receives unemployment benefits wUI
which depend on his labor income w̃ = w ε · l during the last period that he was employed.
If the agent has never been employed, w̃ = 0, the agent only receives wmin. Therefore, in
our model, we can also interpret the lump-sum component wmin of unemployment benefits
as welfare payments.
Let φj(k, w̃, z) and lj(k, w̃, z) denote the measure and the optimal labor supply of the j-year
old household with wealth k, previous labor income w̃, and productivity type z. Effective










φj(k, w̃, z) · ε(z, j) · lj(k, w̃, z) dw̃ dk, (6)
The average effective labor supply l̄ is equal to effective labor N divided by the number of











φj(k, w̃, z) dw̃ dk. (7)
2.2 Government














denotes the fraction of retired agents.
The government policy is characterized by the set Ω = {wmin, θ, ϑb, τ}, where ϑb = b(1−τ)wl̄
denotes the replacement ratio of pensions b.
2.3 Firms
Firms are of measure one. They hire effective labor N and capital K in order to produce
output Y according to:
Y = F (K, N) = KαN1−α. (9)














where δ denotes the depreciation rate of capital.
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2.4 Stationary Equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium applied in this paper uses a recursive representation of the con-
sumer’s problem following Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). Let Vj(k, w̃, z) be the value
of the objective function of a j-period old agent with beginning-of-period asset holdings
k, previous income w̃, and employment type z. V (k, w̃, z) is defined as the solution to the
dynamic program:




1− σ + γ0
(1− l)1−γ1




subject to the budget constraint (4). The next-period value of previous labor income, w̃′,





w̃ z = z1
w · ε(z, j) · lj(k, w̃, z) z > z1.
(13)
In the first period of life, j = 1, agents have no previous labor income, w̃ = 0.
Definition
A Stationary Equilibrium for a given distribution of productivities for the new-born gen-
eration, φ1(0, 0, z), z ∈ Z, and a given set of government policy parameters,
Ω = {wmin, θ, ϑb, τ}, is a collection of value functions Vj(k, w̃, z) of the households, indi-
vidual policy rules for consumption, cj(k, w̃, z), labor supply, lj(k, w̃, z), and next-period
wealth, k′j(k, w̃, z), age-dependent, time-invariant measures of agent types φj(k, w̃, z) for
each age j = 1, 2, . . . , T + TR, relative prices of labor and capital {w, r}, such that:
















k φj(k, w̃, z) dw̃ dk. (15)
Effective labor N is given by (6).
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2. Given relative prices {w, r} and the government policy Ω, the individual policy rules
c(.), l(.), and k′(.) solve the consumer’s dynamic program (12).
3. Firms maximize profits. Factor prices (10) and (11) are equal to the factors’ marginal
productivities, respectively.
4. The goods market clears:
KαN1−α = C + δK. (16)
5. The government budget (8) is balanced.
6. The transition of the productivity types follows the first order Markov process (1).
2.5 Calibration
The steady state distribution of wealth and labor supply, and the effects of a change
in the unemployment compensation system on employment and welfare cannot be studied
analytically but only numerically. For this reason, the model is calibrated in order to match
characteristics of the German economy after unification. The time series data refer to the
period 1990-97. Time periods correspond to years. Data are mainly from the quarterly
national account statistics of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.
The annual data on the unemployment rate is taken from the yearbooks of the German
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Data on the wage and income distribution is
taken from the Socio-Economic Panel for Germany (GSOEP).
Households
The coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is set equal to 2.0. We choose the value 0.995 for
household’s discount factor β implying an annual real interest rate equal to 2.83%. The
parameters γ0 = 0.13 and γ1 = 10 are taken from Heer and Trede (2003). For these values,
the average labor supply of the workers amounts to 0.356, while the coefficient of variation
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for the labor supply is equal to 0.363. Heer and Trede estimate a coefficient of variation
equal to 0.385 in Germany during 1995-96.
Productivity endowment is given by ε(z, j) = ȳj · ezj . The mean efficiency index ȳj of the
j-year old household is computed with the help of German data and graphed in figure
1.8 The productivity of age j is computed with the help of the average hourly wages of
the j-year old during the years 1990-97 following the method of Hansen (1993). Average
productivity is normalized to one. We further interpolated the productivity-age profile with
a polynomial function of order 3. Notice that the productivity-age profile is hump-shaped
and peaks at age 47.
Figure 1: Productivity-age profile in Germany, 1990-97
The productivities z ∈ Z = {z1, z2, . . . , znz} and the transition matrix π(z′|z) are also
taken from Heer and Trede (2003). The number of productivities is set equal to nz = 5.
8We use data from the Cross National Data Files for West Germany during 1990-97 which are extracted
from the GSOEP. I would like to thank Mark Trede for providing me with the data. We only consider
agents who were working 1500 hours per year or more and who earned a wage in excess of one Euro.
The number of observations for each generation ranges between 154 (for the 20-year old) and 765 (for the
29-year old).
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The productivities {z2, z3, z4, z5} = {0.4476, 0.7851, 1.0544, 1.7129} are estimated from the
empirical distribution of hourly wages in Germany (1995). The unemployed worker has





0.3500 0.6500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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In the first period, we assume that unemployment amounts to average unemployment of
10.95% that prevails during the calibration period. The measures of the remaining four






j = 2, . . . , nz.
Government
The government provides unemployment insurance and public pensions. In our benchmark
case, the minimum unemployment insurance payments wmin are set equal to the welfare
payments. In accordance with Heer (2003), the replacement ratios of welfare payments,
wmin, and public pensions, b, are set equal to 30% and 50%, respectively. The progres-
sivity index θ = 0.2 is chosen in order to imply a replacement ratio of unemployment
insurance roughly equal to 50%.10 The income tax rate τ is calculated endogenously from
9We assume that the worker can only reach productivity type z2 after unemployment. This assumption
is mainly for computational reasons. If we had assumed that the worker’s human capital does not depreciate
during unemployment and, therefore, that he would reach his old level of productivity when re-employed,
we would have had to introduce an additional state variable into the model.
10We also computed the equilibrium values for different values of the replacement ratio of welfare pay-
ments (20%) and the replacement ratio of pensions (ϑb = 40%). Our qualitative results are the same as
in the benchmark case.
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1−γ1 σ = 2.0, γ0 = 0.13,
γ1 = 10
discount factor β β = 0.995
production function Y = KαN1−α α = 0.35
depreciation δ δ = 0.04
unemployment insurance wmin, θ wmin/(1− τ)wl̄ = 30%, θ = 0.20
pension payments b ϑb ≡ b/(1− τ)wl̄ = 50%
the government budget (8) and amounts to 23.0%.
Production
In accordance with Heer (2003), the production elasticity of capital is set equal to α = 0.35,
and the annual depreciation rate in Germany amounts to δ = 0.04.
3 Results
In this section, we study the effects of a more progressive indexation of unemployment
benefits to previous wage income. First, we will describe the benchmark case which we
are identifying with the German economy during 1990-97. Second, we analyze the effect of
a change in the indexation of unemployment benefits that keeps total government expen-
ditures on unemployment benefits constant. Finally, given the most recent reform of the
unemployment insurance system in Germany, we also look at the effects of the Hartz IV
reform that has changed the replacement ratio of unemployment benefits relative to net
wages for the long-term unemployed workers.
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3.1 The Benchmark Case
Figure 2: Life-cycle profiles in the benchmark case
In our benchmark case that is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the German
economy during 1990-97, the lump-sum component of unemployment insurance benefits
amounts to 30% of the average net wage, wmin = 0.101. The proportionality factor is
set equal to θ = 20%. The equilibrium values of the capital stock K, effective labor N ,
average labor supply l̄, the wage rate w, and the Gini coefficient of labor earnings Ginil
are presented in the third row of table 2. The aggregate capital stock and effective labor
amount to K = 2.296 and N = 0.186, respectively. Average labor supply l̄ is equal to 0.356
representing approximately one third of the available time endowment. The distribution
of labor income (including the wage replacement income in the form of unemployment
benefits) is characterized by a Gini coefficient equal to 0.335 which compares favorably
with its empirical counterpart. Heer and Trede (2003) compute a Gini coefficient of labor
income equal to 0.317 for the German economy using GSOEP data during 1995-96.
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Table 2: Effects of unemployment insurance indexation
θ wmin K N l̄ w Ginil ∆c
0.00 0.149 2.291 0.185 0.355 1.567 0.332 0.076%
0.20 0.101 2.293 0.186 0.356 1.566 0.335 0%
0.40 0.053 2.298 0.186 0.357 1.565 0.340 -0.048%
The behavior of the agents is typical for the one in life-cycle models. Figure 2 displays
the averages of the capital stock, consumption, effective labor supply, and labor supply for
each generation j = 1, . . . , 60 (the labor supply is zero for the generations j = 41, . . . , 60).
Remember that generation j = 1 corresponds to the 20-year old households. The wealth-
age profile is hump-shaped and peaks at the age of retirement. Consumption is increasing
over age.11 Effective labor, which is the product of hours worked times productivity, is
hump-shaped and peaks at real lifetime age 42 (corresponding to the period 23 in the
model). Accordingly, effective labor peaks prior to age productivity which attains its
maximum at age 47 (compare figure 1). As can be seen from the lower right panel of figure
2, average labor supply decreases over lifetime as agents become wealthier and, therefore,
effective labor supply starts to fall earlier than average productivity. In figure 3, the average
labor supply of the employed workers is illustrated for the different productivities. The
agents with the highest productivities, z = z5, supply the highest amount of labor as in
our model the substitution effect of higher wages per hour dominates the income effect.
3.2 Progression of Unemployment Benefits
In this section, we consider the effect of an increase of the progressivity of unemployment
benefits wUI . In the following we will speak of a progressive unemployment insurance
system if the payments wUI = wmin +θ(1−τ)w̃ are closely linked to previous contributions
11We could have modelled a more realistic consumption-age profile that is hump-shaped if we had
introduced stochastic survival probabilities, uncertain lifetime, or uncertain medical expenditures in old
age. We, however, kept the model as simple as possible in order to economize on computational time.
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Figure 3: Average labor supply of productivity types
w̃. Accordingly, the higher θ, the more progressive is our system. Total government
spending on unemployment benefits remains constant so that an increase of θ is offset by
an equivalent decrease of the lump sum component wmin.
There are three effects of an increase in θ: 1) The incentives of the workers to supply
labor increase because they will receive higher benefits in case they become unemployed.
This effect is illustrated in figure 4 where we illustrate the average labor supply of each
productivity type {z2, z3, z4, z5} for each generation. Obviously, the labor supply increases
if we move from a redistributive scheme with θ = 0.00 (solid line) to a more contributive
scheme with θ = 0.40 (broken line). The increase is unanimous and pertinent to all
generations and productivity types. 2) Workers with high (low) productivity receive higher
(lower) unemployment benefits if they become unemployed. Therefore, the distribution of
labor income (including labor replacement income) becomes more unequal. 3) The effect on
the capital stock is ambiguous since low-productivity (high-productivity) agents decrease
(increase) their savings if they are unemployed, but raise (reduce) their precautionary
savings if employed. In fact, if we move from θ = 0.0 to θ = 0.40, the average capital
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stock of the unemployed workers and the workers with the two lowest productivity types
{z2, z3} increases, while it decreases for the workers with high productivity z ∈ {z4, z5}.
In particular, the lower three productivity types increase their capital stock by 0.051%,
0.049%, and 0.028%, while the top two productivity types decrease their savings by 0.014%
and 0.016% on average.
Our results are summarized in table 2. As our main observation, the progressivity of the
unemployment benefit scheme has only small effects on equilibrium values of our economy.
If we increase the proportionality factor θ from 0% to 40%, average labor supply increases
by 0.5%. The more progressive unemployment insurance scheme redistributes income away
from the low-productivity and younger unemployed workers so that the Gini coefficient of
labor income increases from 0.332 to 0.340. As a consequence, savings also increase by
0.3% as the effect of the increase in the savings of the low-productivity unemployed workers
dominates.
Figure 4: Progressiveness of UI payments and labor supply
Obviously, a more progressive unemployment insurance system increases the welfare of the
high-productivity agents at the expenses of the low-productivity agents. In fact, if we
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move from θ = 0.0 to θ = 0.4, the value of the newborn workers decreases for productivity
types z ∈ {z1, z2, z3}, while it increases for the workers with z ∈ {z4, z5}. In the aggregate
economy, agents also increase their savings and supply more labor. These efficiency effects
will also improve welfare since, in the present economy, both the accumulation of capital
and the labor supply are sub-optimal: The households accumulate too little savings as we
specified a lump-sum pension system and the labor supply decision is distorted due to the
taxation of labor income. In order to compare the alternative unemployment insurance
schemes we need a measure of average utility. As it is common in the literature on com-
putable general equilibrium, we measure welfare by the expected discounted lifetime utility
of the newborn generation. The change in welfare relative to the benchmark equilibrium
with {wmin, θ} = {0.101, 0.20} is computed as the compensation in consumption required
in order to make the newborn generation indifferent between the benchmark economy and
the economy with the alternative unemployment insurance scheme.
The welfare changes ∆c are presented in the last column of table 2. The optimal scheme
consists of a pure lump-sum payment. Reducing the proportionality factor θ from 20%
to 0% while simultaneously increasing the lump-sum component wmin from 0.101 to 0.149
increases welfare by 0.076% of total consumption. The effect on welfare results from the
consideration of different productivity types.12 The unemployment insurance system redis-
tributes more income to the unemployed agent with relative little wealth (with former low
productivity); in addition, the insurance properties of the system are improved in the sense
that the total uncertainty of individual labor income is reduced. Even though this change
in welfare seems to be small remember that 1) we kept the total government spending on
unemployment compensation constant, 2) only the unemployed workers, who only consti-
tute 10.9% of all workers, are affected by this measure directly, and 3) households can also
insure themselves against the bad luck of unemployment with the help of precautionary
savings. We, therefore, carefully interpret our results in the way that it is optimal not to
12In the working paper version of this paper, we do not consider heterogeneous productivity types.
In this scenario, the opposite result holds and the optimal unemployment insurance system is a purely
contributive system.
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index unemployment benefits to previous earnings.
3.3 The Hartz IV Reform
The Hartz IV reform was launched by the German government in 2004 and became effec-
tive at the beginning of 2005. Among others, this reform resulted in a limited duration of
unemployment benefits equal to 12 months. The level of unemployment benefits remained
unchanged. In addition, unemployment assistance (”Arbeitslosenhilfe”) and social assis-
tance (”Sozialhilfe”) were merged into the new unemployment benefit II (”Arbeitslosengeld
II”).13 As the level of ”Arbeitslosengeld II” is less than the level of unemployment assis-
tance, the long-term unemployed will receive lower unemployment insurance. In 2006, the
monthly payments of ”Arbeitslosengeld II” amount to 345 Euro in West Germany and will
also rise to this level in East Germany.14 Therefore, the replacement ratio of unemployment
insurance payments to the long-term unemployed workers (those who are unemployed for
more than one year) drops from approximately 50% to 24%.15
In the following, we will compute how this change will affect employment, the distribution
of labor income, and welfare. Let unemployment insurance payments be denoted by wUI =
wmin + θi(1− τ)w̃, i = 1, 2, where θ1 and θ2 denote the proportionality factor for the short-
term and long-term unemployed worker, respectively.16 As the ”Arbeitslosengeld II” is paid
lump-sum, we set θ2 = 0 and calibrate wmin so that the replacement ratio of wmin relative
13Hunt (1995) and Steiner (1997) provide a more detailed description of the German unemployment
insurance system prior to Hartz IV.
14For a description of Hartz IV and its effects on the replacement ratio of unemployment insurance
please see Althammer (2004).
15The replacement ratio of the ”Arbeitslosengeld II” is computed with data provided by the Statistische
Bundesamt. The average monthly net wage income amounted to 1456 Euro in 2005. Data for 2006 is not
yet available.
16We refrain from the presentation of a modified version of the model that accounts for this two-tier
structure of unemployment insurance. The reformulation of the model is straightforward. In essence, we
have to introduce an additional, binary state variable that takes on the value one (zero) if the agent is
(not) unemployed for more than one period (=1 year).
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to the net wage is equal to 24%. Prior to Hartz IV, the replacement ratio of unemployment
assistance was equal to 50% implying θ2 = 0.26. For the short-term unemployed, we also
set the replacement ratio equal to 50% implying θ1 = 0.26 both prior and after the reform.
As total expenditures on unemployment insurance decline after Hartz IV, the income tax
rate τ adjusts in order to keep the budget balanced.
Our results for the effects of the Hartz IV reform are summarized in table 3. Obviously,
the effects of the Hartz IV reform are very small. The equilibrium values of savings and
average labor supply are hardly affected. Even though welfare improves after Hartz IV, the
quantitative effect is of small magnitude and amounts to only 0.05% of total consumption.
We also compute the case that the reform would have cut unemployment benefits of the
short-term unemployed as well. In the last row of table 3, equilibrium values are presented
for the case that also the short-term unemployed workers only receive ”Arbeitslosengeld II”.
In this case, precautionary savings rise and the capital stock increases by 2%. Of course,
the distribution of labor income becomes more unequal and the Gini coefficient increases
from 0.332 to 0.358. The effect on welfare is unambiguously positive and amounts to 0.22%
of total consumption.17
Table 3: Effects of Hartz IV reform
scenario wmin {θ1, θ2} K N l̄ w Ginil ∆c
before Hartz IV 0.0803 {0.26, 0.26} 2.291 0.186 0.356 1.567 0.332 0
after Hartz IV 0.0803 {0.26, 0.00} 2.292 0.186 0.357 1.567 0.334 0.05%
0.0825 {0.0, 0.0} 2.332 0.186 0.357 1.576 0.358 0.22%
At this point, let us mention a word of caution. In our model, we neglect any effects of the
unemployment insurance system on the unemployment rate. If unemployment benefits fall,
17An additional reduction of the lump-sum component wmin to 5% of the average net wage with zero
contributive rates θ1 = θ2 results in a considerable welfare loss equal to 8.7% of total consumption.
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agents may increase their search effort in order to become re-employed again. In previous
work, we have also considered the effects of a two-tier structure of the unemployment system
in a model of search unemployment (see Heer, 2003). Different from the present model,
however, we did not model different levels of productivity among the workers and only
analyzed the case of inelastic labor supply. Therefore, we only considered variation of labor
along the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin and neglected redistribution
of income among the workers. In Heer (2003) we show that the level of unemployment
benefits and unemployment assistance is important for the search effort of the workers and
that equilibrium unemployment may fall by approximately 1.0% if the replacement ratio
is reduced by 20%. Therefore, we would like to interpret our results for both total effective
hours worked N and welfare that we presented in table 3 as a lower estimate of the true
values.
4 Conclusion
We analyze the effects of a change in the unemployment insurance scheme from one that
pays lump-sum benefits relative to one with benefit payments that are proportional to
past contributions. We find that, in the latter case, working hours and savings increase,
even though the quantitative effect is small. These efficiency effects, however, have to be
contrasted with 1) the distribution effects since such a more contributive unemployment
insurance system redistributes income from the low-productivity and young unemployed
workers to the high-productivity and older unemployed workers and 2) the insurance effects
since the ex ante labor income uncertainty increases. The welfare effect is found to be
modest, but unambiguously negative. As a very careful conclusion, we may interpret our
results to give support to a lump-sum unemployment insurance arrangement. We also study
the likely effects of the Hartz IV reform that reduces unemployment insurance payments
to the long-term unemployed. In the German two-tier unemployment system we find that
the replacement ratio of long-term unemployment assistance is much less important for the
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individual decision on labor supply than the replacement ratio of unemployment benefits
for the short-term unemployed worker. Welfare and efficiency effects of the Hartz IV
reform, therefore, are positive but small.
In our analysis, we neglect two important effects of the labor market due to the computa-
tional complexity. First, we assume the number of unemployed workers to be exogenous.
Of course, if unemployment insurance payments decrease agents search harder for a job and
equilibrium unemployment declines. Similarly, the reservation wage falls and unemploy-
ment is smaller in the case of wage bargaining. This effect, however, is likely to be small
if we only compare different unemployment benefit schemes that keep total government
spending on unemployment insurance fixed. In our corresponding working paper (Heer,
2002b) we show this effect to be negligible. In the case of the Hartz IV reform, however,
a change in the replacement ratio of unemployment assistance payments is likely to affect
the number of unemployed workers. Second, we assume that the household consists of
one worker. We neglect any effects resulting from the composition of households. One
possible important effect of the indexation of unemployment benefits to previous contri-
butions might result from the consideration of two-person households. Households may
be composed of an employed worker and the employed/unemployed spouse. Indexation
of unemployment benefits to previous earnings might affect the decision of the spouse to
work, e.g., part-time. The incentives to work part-time are increased if unemployment
insurance payments are provided lump-sum irrespective of previous contributions. Such a
scheme will result in higher total employment, even though problems associated with the
moral hazard of the job retention effort will be accentuated as well.
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5 Appendix: The Solution Algorithm
The model has no analytical solution. We apply a standard numerical solution method
for such kind of heterogenous-agent models with an endogenous distribution and choose
value function iteration in order to compute the steady state of the model.18 However,
we modify the algorithm as follows: Our four-dimensional state space {k, w̃, z, j} consists
of two discrete variables, {z, j} and two continuous variables, {k, w̃}. In order to apply
the value function iteration method, we also have to discretize the sub-state space {k, w̃}.
Therefore, we have to chose a grid of size nk × nw̃ × nz × (T + TR) over the state space.
If we used standard value function iteration, we would have to iterate over all possible
next-period values {k′, w̃′} and, therefore could only choose a coarse grid over {k, w̃} in
order to compute the solution in a reasonable time. Instead, we modify the algorithm so
that we can choose a fine grid over k with nk = 1, 000 points. In our modified version, we
compute the optimal labor supply l of the j-year old household with productivity z > z1
and, hence, w̃′, from the first-order condition of the household. For j < T , this condition
is given by:




t−j−1 βt−jc−σt θ(1− τ)we(z, j), (18)
where ct = ct(kt, wε(z, j), z
1) and kt+1 = k
′(kt, wε(z, j), z1) are the optimal policy functions
of the unemployed at age t = j + 1, . . . , T . As we compute the value function recursively
starting in period T + TR, these policy functions are known. πzz1 denotes the probability
that a worker with productivity z is unemployed during the next period, πzz1 = π(ε
′ =
z1|ε = z). Different from the standard first-order condition of the household with respect
to labor, (18) contains an additive term on the right-hand side that reflects the effect of
the higher working time on the expected future unemployment benefits. As we compute
18See Heer and Maussner (2005), Chapter 7, for a detailed description on the computation of overlapping
generations models with individual or aggregate uncertainty.
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the optimal labor supply from the first-order condition, we do not have to iterate over w̃′
in our value function iteration.
Our algorithm is described by the following steps:
1. Choose the policy parameters wmin, θ, and ϑb.
2. Make initial guesses of τ , K, and N and compute the factor prices w and r.
3. Compute the household’s decision function by backwards induction with the help of
value function iteration.
4. Compute the steady-state distribution of assets, employment, consumption, and la-
bor supply.
5. Compute N , l̄, and the average asset holdings of all households from the aggregate
consistency conditions.
6. Compute the values τ , w, and r that solves the firm’s Euler equations and the
government budget.
7. Update K, N , w, r, τ , and wmin, and return to step 3 if necessary.
In step 4, the steady-state distribution is computed by forward iteration starting with the
20-year old (corresponding to the 1-period old generation in the model) who has no wealth
and no previous income. In addition, the initial distribution of z is given.19 The algorithm
stops as soon as two successive values of K and N diverge by less than 0.01%, respectively.
The Fortran program fa heer.for can be downloaded from the site
http://pro.unibz.it//staff//bheer//.
19A more detailed description of the numerical computation of the stationary distribution can be found
in Heer and Maussner (2005).
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